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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Order Involving Plaintiff's Employer CCC&T
The

legislative

history

of the Liability

Reform

Act, and

important terms in the Act, are ambiguous. However, it is clear that
the legislature intended to abolish the unfair doctrine of joint and
several liability by enacting the Liability Reform Act.

The trial

court committed reversible error by attempting to reestablish joint
and several liability in this action, because the effect of its order
may require Jacobsen to pay damages that the jury would otherwise
apportion to plaintiff's employer CCC&T. This Court should reject the
trial court's attempt to resurrect joint and several liability, and
reaffirm the intent of the Liability Reform Act that a defendant will
only be responsible to pay damages which correspond to its own
conduct, and not the conduct of others.

The Court should adopt an

analysis based on causation, rather than on fault, in order to allow
juries to fairly allocate responsibility for damages.
Order Involving Cross-Claim Against Boman
Boman must indemnify Jacobsen in accordance with the indemnity
provision in the prime contract because such provision was validly
incorporated by reference in the subcontract entered into between
Jacobsen and Boman.

The recent Utah Court of Appeals decision in

Gordon v. CRS Consulting Engineers, Inc., 820 P. 2d 492 (Utah App.
1991) establishes that an indemnity provision that is incorporated by
reference in another document is enforceable.
Alternatively, Boman is liable in indemnity to Jacobsen under the
indemnity provision in the subcontract between Boman and Jacobsen.
This indemnity liability results from involvement of Boman's agents
CCC&T and plaintiff Daniel Brown in plaintiff's accident.
1

ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER CONCERNING PLAINTIFF'S
EMPLOYER CCC&T CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR.
A.

The district court's ruling that
evidence of CCC&T's conduct will
submitted to the jury was erroneous.

no
be

As explained in Jacobsen's initial brief, the trial court not
only ruled that CCC&T's "fault" could not be apportioned by the jury,
but that evidence of its conduct would not be submitted to the jury.
Jacobsen argued that this ruling was manifestly erroneous because it
would not permit the jury to clearly understand how the accident
happened, and would not allow Jacobsen to argue that CCC&T was the
sole proximate cause of the accident.

Notwithstanding the language

in the order that "no evidence of CCC&T's conduct will be submitted
to the finders of fact in this case" (R. 209) , appellees contend that
the trial court did not rule that evidence of CCC&T's conduct would
not be submitted to the jury, and that, in fact, the trial court's
order would not prohibit Jacobsen from arguing that CCC&T was the sole
proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. Jacobsen observes that the
express terms of the order speak for themselves, and clearly refute
appellees' contention that Jacobsen has "overstated" the scope of the
trial court's order.
Second, with respect to appellee Brown's argument that the trial
court's decision to preclude the jury from hearing evidence concerning
CCC&T's conduct, even if erroneous, was harmless error, Jacobsen notes
that Brown's argument is merely based on his interpretation of the
facts.

In effect, Brown's contention is that the facts demonstrate

that CCC&T was not the sole proximate cause of the accident.
contention is without legal basis.
2
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apportioned by the finder of fact.

Alternatively, it may have been

the legislature's understanding that the change simply shortened and
simplified the statute, without substantively changing its meaning and
application.

These

possible

reasons

for

the

amendment

are

as

plausible as the reason asserted by respondents, which is that the
legislature intended to prohibit the finder of fact from considering
the conduct of the plaintiff's employer in causing the injury.
Appellees rely on certain other "evidence" of legislative intent,
which they argue establishes their interpretation of the Liability
Reform Act.

CCC&T argues that the affidavit of Workers Compensation

Fund counsel Dennis Lloyd is relevant, while Brown contends that a
letter from Senator Cornaby is material to the question.

Jacobsen

responds that Mr. Lloyd's testimony is irrelevant. The mere fact that
the Workers

Compensation

irrelevant to this appeal.

Fund

opposed

the bill

in one

form

is

There is absolutely no evidence that the

Workers Compensation Fund's opposition to the bill had anything to do
with

the

bill's

subsequent

amendment

by

the

legislature.

The

affidavit should be disregarded as irrelevant and immaterial.
Concerning Senator Cornaby's letter, Jacobsen notes that the
letter is not a part of the record on appeal.

Under well-established

principles of appellate review, plaintiff cannot rely upon materials
which are not found in the record.

Pilcher v. Department of Social

Services. 663 P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 1983).

In sum, the legislative

history of the Liability Reform Act is anything but clear.
Important
ambiguous.

terms used

in the Liability

Reform

Act

are

also

Specifically, the terms "fault" and "defendant," as used

in the Act, are susceptible to different meanings.

For example,

"defendant" is defined in § 78-27-37(1) as "any person not immune from
4
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For example,

consider the hypothetical accident where a large piece of cement falls
off of a state-owned overpass, and strikes the windshield of a car.
The driver thereafter careens out of control, and his car strikes a
three-year old on a tricycle, who was riding in the street.

The

driver later claims his brakes malfunctioned.
Under the facts of this hypothetical, the State is probably
immune from suit under the Governmental Immunity Act because the
defective nature of the overpass was a latent condition for which
immunity has not been waived.

1

Further, young children, as a matter

of law, cannot have "fault" in Utah. 2

Moreover, the brake manufac-

turer, if liable for producing a defective product, would probably be
liable under the doctrine of strict product liability, a theory of
recovery not based on negligence.
Jacobsen submits that it is clearly the intent of the Liability
Reform Act that the jury which decides the merits of the lawsuit which
ensues from the above accident be permitted to review the underlying
facts of the entire accident in order to properly allocate responsibility. In other words, the conduct of the State should be considered
by the jury, even though it cannot be an actual "defendant" because
of governmental immunity.

Similarly, the jury should be able to

consider whether the young child's conduct — even though not legally
negligent or culpable —

contributed to or caused the accident.

Finally, it is obvious that damages caused by the "no-fault" concept
of strict product liability can be compared to traditional fault based

1

See, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(16).

2

See, Kiloack v. Wicmall, 604 P.2d 462 (Utah 1979).
6
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CCC&T relies o n this Court's decisions in Phillips v. Union
Pacific Railroad C o . . 614 P. 2d 153 (Utah 1980) and Curtis v. Harmon
Electric. Inc.. 552 P.2d 117 (Utah 1 9 7 6 ) , and on certain portions
of Larson's treatise o n w o r k e r s ' compensation, in support of its
contention
Jacobsen notes that these authorities involve t h e
issue of whether a third-party can circumvent the exclusive remedy
provision of w o r k e r s 7 compensation t o obtain contribution or
indemnity from the injured person's employer. Under such circumstances, it is certainly reasonable t o hold that an employer is
immune from such actions on t h e basis that it cannot have conventional "fault."
In effect, t h e holdings in these cases simply
reaffirm that w o r k e r s ' compensation is t h e exclusive remedy of an
injured employee, and that a n employer will never have t o pay more
money than is required under t h e W o r k e r s ' Compensation A c t .
However, in this appeal t h e tort liability of CCC&T for indemnity
or contribution is n o t a n issue, and accordingly, t h e authorities
relied o n b y CCC&T o n this question have little relevance.
7

determined, the jury must consider the entire universe of factors that
combined to cause the accident in question, Jacobsen submits that the
purpose

of the

contradicting

Liability

the

Reform

exclusive

Act

remedy

can be
provision

satisfied
of

the

without
Workers'

Compensation Act by permitting juries to compare the conduct of
employers, without holding them civilly liable.
C.

The trial court's order should be reversed
because it attempts to reestablish the
statutorily abrogated concept of joint and
several liability.

Although much of the legislature's purpose in enacting the
Liability Reform Act is ambiguous, it is apparent that one of the
paramount purposes of the Act was to completely and totally eliminate
the doctrine and joint and several liability.

The statute itself

makes clear that "no defendant is liable to any person seeking
recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to that defendant" (§ 78-27-38), and that "the maximum amount
for which a defendant may be liable . . .

is that percentage or

proportion of the damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion
of fault attributed to that defendant."

(§ 78-27-40).

The legislative history also establishes the legislature's intent
to abolish joint and several liability.

In this regard, it is impor-

tant to note that each preliminary draft of the Liability Reform Act,
and the Bill as finally enacted, states in the title that the purpose
of the Act, among other things, is "abolishing joint and several
liability."

(R. 174-75, 177-78, 180-84, attached as Addenda 6-8,

Brief of CCC&T).
Notwithstanding the legislature's obvious intent to completely
abolish joint and several liability, CCC&T and plaintiff argue that
8

the trial court did not commit error when it retained joint and
several liability in this case. Clearly, if the trial court's ruling
is allowed to stand, Jacobsen may be put in the position of paying
damages for conduct that would have otherwise been attributed to
another person; i.e., plaintiff's employer CCC&T. Such an outcome is,
quite simply, joint and several liability.

Because one of the

Liability Reform Act's primary purposes was to abolish this unfair
doctrine, this Court should reject appellees' argument that the trial
court did not err by ruling that the fault of all potentially
responsible persons should not be apportioned by the jury.
D.

In light of the ambiguous legislative
history behind the Liability Reform Act,
the Act's clear intent to abolish joint and
several liability, and the susceptibility
of the Act's key terms to different
meanings, Jacobsen proposes that this court
analyze the issue in terms of "causation11
rather than "fault."

Given the ambiguity of the legislative history behind the
Liability Reform Act, the susceptibility of the key words "fault" and
"defendant" in the Act to different interpretations, and in light of
the Act's clear purpose to abolish joint and several liability,
Jacobsen suggests that use of the concept of causation will make the
Liability Reform Act internally consistent, and allow fair treatment
of all participants in an accident.
Adopting a "causation" analysis, instead of one based on
"fault," makes sense because of the confusion the word "fault"
generates. It is unfortunate that the legislature decided to utilize
"fault" in the Act because fault is the equivalent of negligence, and
negligence is necessarily made up of the elements of (1) a duty, (2)
breach of the duty, (3) proximate causation, and (4) damages. See,
9

Williams v. Melby. 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985). When "fault" is examined
in this light, it is apparent why confusion can cloud the jury's
process of apportioning "fault." The finder of fact cannot determine
a particular defendant's percentage of "fault" until that defendant's
role in the causation of the accident is understood.

Further, it is

obvious that for the finder of fact to determine a defendant's
causation, the conduct of all participants in an action must be
analyzed.

In the case of an accident which occurs within the scope

of employment, the analysis would necessarily include whether the
employer's conduct contributed to cause the accident.

Utah case

authority supports the analysis of the apportionment of an employer's
conduct in contributing to an accident in terms of causation, rather
than in terms of fault.
1301

In Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d

(Utah 1981), this Court required trial courts to apply a

"comparative fault" rule between defendants under circumstances when
one defendant may be liable under a strict liability theory, and
another may be liable under a theory based in negligence.
1303.

Id. at

In establishing this rule, this Court recognized that strict

liability is not based on "fault," but held that the relative amount
of "causation" of the defective product should be compared with the
fault of other parties to achieve a fair apportionment of damages.
Id. at 1304.

This Court made the following observations in ruling

that causation should be compared by the trier of fact:
Other courts have rejected the application of comparative
fault principles to strict liability claims because
culpable conduct is not at issue in strict liability, only
causation.
We find this unpersuasive.
There may be
semantic difficulties in comparing strict liability and
negligence, but we believe judges and juries will have no
difficulty assigning the relative responsibility each is to
bear for a particular injury when the ultimate issues in
such comparison are relative fault and relative causation.
10

Id. (footnote omitted).
The application of the Mulherin analysis to the issues in this
appeal is appropriate. Although different categories of persons and
entities may have different duties and liabilities, the comparison of
all participants' "causation" is necessary for an equitable apportionment of damages, and to avoid joint and several liability, a doctrine
which the Liability Reform Act was designed to abolish.

Indeed,

causation is the one element common to virtually all vehicles of
recovery, including strict product liability, breach of warranty and
contract, workers' compensation, and negligence, in all of its
degrees.

In light of its truly universal nature, causation is the

ideal concept to employ

in the analysis of fairly apportioning

liability for damages.
Analyzing an employer's contribution to an accident in terms of
causation, rather than fault, makes eminent sense. It is obvious that
one can "cause" an injury without being at "fault," or culpable in
some other manner. Under this analysis, after determining whether an
employer caused the accident in whole or in part, a determination
could then be made by the fact finder concerning the percentage of the
plaintiff's damages that should be paid by the non-immune defendants.
The special verdict form under this analysis could take the following
form:
Did the employer cause or contribute to the cause of the
accident?
Yes

No

If yes, what percentage of the accident was caused by the
employer?
%
Did the defendant cause the accident?
11

If yes, was the defendant negligent?
If yes, what percentage of plaintiff's damages should the
defendant pay?
%
This analysis harmonizes the contradictory provisions within the
Liability Reform Act, and fully retains the immunity granted to
employers under the Workers Compensation Act.
E.

The decisions from other jurisdictions
cited in Jacobsen's initial brief constitute persuasive authority that the fault of
all participants in an action must be
apportioned to achieve fairness and equity.

Appellees attempted to distinguish the facts of the numerous
decisions cited by Jacobsen in its Opening Brief supporting the
principle that the fault of all participants in an accident must be
considered and apportioned by the finder of fact.

It is true that

each state has a slightly different statutory workers compensation and
comparative fault scheme.

However, as a general proposition, the

cases overwhelmingly demonstrate that the courts in other jurisdictions, whenever possible, have resolved the fault apportionment issues
presented to them in a manner which maximizes the fairness associated
with the process of apportioning

fault.

In other words, such

decisions support the argument that, if possible, this Court should
permit the allocation of an employer's conduct by the jury.
Apportioning the plaintiff's employer's causation is not prohibited
by the Liability Reform Act, and does not conflict with the exclusive
remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act because no civil
liability is imposed on the employer.

12

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER CONCERNING
CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR.
A.

BOMAN

Boman owes indemnity to Jacobsen pursuant
to the indemnity provision in the prime
contract.

Clearly, the indemnity provision in the prime contract requires
Boman to indemnify Jacobsen if that provision can be incorporated by
reference in the subcontract between Boman and Jacobsen.

Boman

asserts various grounds for its argument that the indemnity agreement
in the prime contract cannot be so incorporated. First, Boman argues
that it need not indemnify Jacobsen under the indemnity provision of
the prime contract because, under the strict construction rule, that
indemnity provision cannot be incorporated by reference
subcontract.

in the

Boman invokes the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in

Gordon v. CRS Consulting Engineers, Inc., 820 P. 2d 492 (Utah App.
1991) in support of this argument. The Gordon Court's statement that
"Utah courts apply the rule of strict construction when confronted
with an indemnity agreement," jLd. at 454, is expressly contradicted
by this Court's ruling in Freund v. Utah Power & Light, 793 P.2d 362
(Utah 1990) , wherein the strict construction rule was virtually
abandoned. The Court of Appeals never referred to the Freund case in
its opinion. 5 Obviously, the Court of Appeals7 erroneous holding in
Gordon, which overlooked the contrary decision from this Court, is not
persuasive. Freund did away with the traditional strict construction
doctrine in Utah.

Consequently, there is no legal reason not to

permit the incorporation by reference of the indemnity provision in
the prime contract, and enforce such provision against Boman.

5

Further, the briefs filed in the Gordon appeal never cited
Freund, apparently because of oversight on counsel's part.
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Boman also attempts to distinguish Freund from the facts of this
case, because in Freund, "sophisticated entities had bargained for and
prepared explicit indemnification agreements" which contained "clear
and unequivocal language" after lengthy negotiations.

(Brief of

Boman, p. 11). This attempt to "distinguish" Freund from the facts
in this action must be rejected.
First, it is clear from the Freund decision that the primary
factor in this Court's determination that the indemnitor was obligated
to indemnify Utah Power & Light Company was the language in the
contract. 793 P. 2d at 371-72. Further, to the extent the sophistication of the parties and the negotiation process were important to the
Court's decision, Jacobsen notes that there is no evidence in the
record to support Boman's representations that it is an unsophisticated "mom and pop" steel fabrication company, that the subcontract
is merely a "form," or that the subcontract contains "boilerplate
language" (whatever that is).

Rather, the evidence in the record is

that Boman entered into a $603,056 subcontract to fabricate, supply
and erect the structural steel for a multi-level office building (R.
401-406), and that Boman entered into numerous contractual arrangements with various entities in the course of completing its subcontract, including Jacobsen, CCC&T and Miller Trucking. (R. 412-414).
The record is thus replete with evidence that Boman is a sophisticated
commercial entity with experience in the negotiation and fashioning
of complex contracts involving large sums of money.

Boman's attempt

to characterize itself as small and unsophisticated is without factual
basis.
There is absolutely no reason not to apply this Court's holding
in Freund in this appeal. Application of that decision means that the
14

heightened or strict construction rule is not applied to the indemnity
contract in question.

If that rule is not applied, the indemnity

provision in the prime contract is enforceable against Boman.
Boman also argues that, if Utah law permits the incorporation by
reference of indemnity provisions, the relevant incorporation language
in the subcontract is only applicable to "the work herein described,"
and that this phrase does not require Boman to indemnify Jacobsen.
Boman reasons that because its contract with Jacobsen did not include
any provision for installation of the safety cable, it has no indemnity obligation to Jacobsen because the cable is not part of the
"work" described in the subcontract.
Boman's

simplistic

approach

to

this

argument

ignores the

undisputed fact that the "work" Boman was to perform pursuant to the
subcontract was to "furnish material, fabrication and erection" of the
building's structural steel.

(R. 401).

This broad definition of

Boman's contractual responsibilities means that "the work" Boman was
obligated to perform under the subcontract must be interpreted to
include anything reasonably related to the erection of the building's
structural steel.

See, e.g., Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. El Paso

Natural Gas Co. . 17 Utah 2d 255, 408 P.2d 910 (1965), where this Court
explained that an indemnitee's rights under an indemnity contract "are
not limited by the traditional tort concept of proximate cause." Id.
at 913.
Because it is undisputed that the plaintiff was involved in the
building's erection when he fell, his accident obviously resulted from
Boman's involvement in the "work."

Boman's attempt to limit its

indemnity exposure solely to the safety cable issue must be rejected
because Boman's "work" under the subcontract broadly included the
15

completion of all steel erection, which plaintiff was working on when
he fell. Further, Boman's argument ignores the factual background of
the accident in this case.

Plaintiff was not injured solely because

there was no safety cable installed where he stepped off the building.
Rather, the accident was caused by a myriad of factors, including
plaintiff's losing track of where he was, and CCC&T's failure to train
plaintiff to weld from the outside edge in. All of the factors that
combined to cause the accident related, directly or indirectly, to the
"work" Boman obligated itself to perform under the subcontract. Boman
is thus obligated to indemnify Jacobsen.
Boman cites cases from other jurisdictions which support its
argument that the prime contract's indemnity provision cannot be
incorporated by reference.
several reasons.

Those decisions are inapplicable for

First, they all rely on the strict construction

rule, which this Court largely rejected in Freund (see Reply Brief,
supra, p. 13).
Second, such decisions from other jurisdictions are irrelevant
in light of the fact that the holding in Gordon v. CRS Consulting
Engineers, Inc. that an indemnity provision can properly be incorporated by reference. In that case, the Court of Appeals sustained the
validity of the indemnity agreement in the State's contract with
Skyline Construction. Notably, the indemnity provision was not in the
contract itself, but was rather incorporated by reference in a
separate document entitled General Conditions and Specifications. 820
P.2d at 494. Thus, Gordon establishes that indemnity provisions are
enforceable when

incorporated

by

reference.

This position is

completely harmonious with this Court's virtual abandonment of the
strict construction rule in Freund*
16

Finally, the decisions from other states cited by Boman are
distinguishable on their facts.

In Wyoming Johnson, Inc. v. Stag

Industries, 662 P. 2d 96 (Wyo. 1983), the Wyoming Supreme Court refused
to enforce an indemnity

clause which had been

incorporated by

reference because the incorporation provision in the subcontract was
not sufficiently express and clear. However, in the captioned matter,
it is apparent that Boman intended to be bound by the terms of the
indemnity clause in the prime contract.

This intent is clearly

evidenced by the provision in the subcontract wherein Boman agreed
that the indemnity clause in the prime contract is controlling in the
event of contradiction with the indemnity provision in the subcontract:
Subcontractors shall indemnify contractor and/or owner
against, and save each harmless from:
*

*

*

(2) any and all loss, damage, injury, liability and claims
thereof for injuries to or death of persons . . . resulting
directly or indirectly from subcontractor's performance of
this agreement, regardless of the negligence of owner,
contractor or their agents or employees: provided that
where such loss, damage, injury, liability or claims are
the result of active negligence on the part of owner or
contractor or their respective agents or employees and is
not caused or contributed to by omission to perform some
duty also imposed on subcontractor, his agents or
employees, such indemnity shall not apply to such party
guilty of such active negligence unless the prime contractor documents otherwise provide . . . (emphasis added)
Thus, Boman agreed that in the event of an inconsistency or contradiction in the indemnification clauses found in the subcontract and prime
contract, the prime contract would govern.

This clear evidence of

Boman7s intent to be bound by the prime contract distinguishes this
matter from Wyoming Johnson.
Allison Steel Manufacturing Co. v. Superior Court, 523 P.2d 803
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(Ariz. App. 1974), is distinguishable on similar grounds. In Allison
Steel, the subcontractor specifically agreed in the subcontract to
perform according to the general contract "insofar as the terms [of
the general contract] shall not be in conflict with the terms [of the
subcontract]."

Id. at 805.

As set forth above, the opposite

situation is present in this case. Whereas it was agreed between the
parties in Allison Steel that the terms of the subcontract govern in
the case of conflict between the two agreements, in the captioned
matter, Boman agreed that the terms of the prime contract would
control if a conflict between the two contracts arose.
Boman also cites Goldman v. Ecco-Phoenix Electric Corp., 396 P. 2d
377, 41 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1964) in support of its position. However, in
Goldman

The last clause of the incorporation provision in question

was considered confusing and ambiguous. The incorporation clause read
as follows:
Subcontractor hereby agrees * * * to be bound to Clovis
Construction Co. [the general contractor] in the same
manner and to the same extent as Clovis is bound to the
owner under the general contract, to the extent of work
provided for in this agreement.
Id. at 378, n. 1.

The Court noted that the last phrase in the

incorporation clause, "to the extent of work provided for in this
agreement," allowed for two opposing interpretations.

In contrast,

the incorporation provision in the captioned matter is clear and
unambiguous, simply stating:

"Subcontractor specifically agrees to

be bound to Contractor by all obligations of the prime contract as
they may apply to the work herein described as if Contractor were in
the place of the Owner, and Subcontractor were in the place of
Contractor." (R. 401).
Goldman

is further distinguishable on the ground that the
18

subcontract did not contain any indemnity clause whatsoever, and the
prime contractor attempted to impose the indemnity provision in the
general contract through the "loose and obscure" language of the
incorporation clause in the subcontract.

However, in the captioned

matter, Boman fully intended to indemnify Jacobsen, as evidenced by
the indemnity provision found in its subcontract.
Thus, even if the issue of whether an indemnity provision can be
incorporated by reference had not already been established in Utah by
the Court of Appeals' decision in Gordon, the cases relied on by Boman
are distinguishable on their facts, and are inapplicable to the
Court's consideration of the issues in this appeal.
Finally, Boman argues that because the prime contract is a
"standard" AIA document it should be unenforceable. This argument is,
to say the least, puzzling.

Neither Gordon nor Freund stand for the

proposition that "form contracts" are not enforceable, particularly
when commercial entities are the contracting parties.
contracts have been enforced

Indeed, AIA 6

in a multitude of cases

in most

jurisdictions. See generally, AIA Building Construction Legal Citator
(1987) .
Summary
The indemnity provision in the prime contract requires Boman to
indemnify Jacobsen against "all claims . . . arising out of or
resulting from the performance of the work . . . caused" by Boman's
subcontractors.

"The work" is defined in the prime contract as "the

construction and services required by the contract documents, whether
completed or partially completed, and includes all other labor,
6

"AIA" is the abbreviation for The American Institute of
Architects. (R. 429).
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materials, equipment and services provided or to be provided by the
contractor to fulfil the contractor's obligations.
constitute the whole or a part of the project."

The work may

(R. 434).

Because Daniel Brown, and his employer CCC&T, were subcontractors
of Boman, and were undisputably involved in the "work" when the
accident occurred, Boman is responsible to indemnify Jacobsen under
the clear terms of the indemnity provision in the prime contract. It
makes no difference that Boman had little involvement at the site, or
that Boman, personally, was not culpable in connection with Mr.
Brown's accident.

The concepts of "negligence" and "fault" are

irrelevant in connection with Jacobsen's contractual indemnity claim
against Boman.

See, e.g., Buscaglia v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas, 68

N.J.Super. 508, 515, 172 A.2d 703, 707 (1961), where the New Jersey
Superior Court explained that "[cjausation, not negligence, is the
touchstone" of indemnity liability.

This Court should enforce the

indemnity provision in the prime contract and rule that Boman is
obligated to indemnify Jacobsen unless Jacobsen is found to be the
sole cause of plaintiff's injuries.
B.

Boman owes indemnity to Jacobsen pursuant
to
the
indemnity
provision
in the
subcontract.

Assuming that the indemnity provision of the prime contract is
not enforceable on Boman, Boman argues that it does not owe indemnity
under the provisions in its subcontract with Jacobsen.

Again, Boman

argues that it is not responsible to indemnify Jacobsen because the
installation of the safety cables was not part of the "work" within
the meaning of paragraph 8.D. of the subcontract.

This argument

misses the point. It is irrelevant that the safety cable was not part
of Boman's performance under the subcontract.
20

The issue is whether

the plaintiff's

accident

resulted

"directly

[Boman's] performance of the agreement."

or

indirectly

(R. 404-405).

from
Boman

concedes in its brief that the subcontract required Boman to "furnish
material, fabrication, and erection" of the building's structural
steel.

Because it is undisputed that the plaintiff was involved in

the building's erection when he fell, his accident "resulted" from
Boman's performance of the agreement.
Boman also argues that the indemnity provision in the subcontract
is unenforceable because it does not specifically mention that Boman
must indemnify for the acts of its independent contractors.

This

argument is without merit because Boman agreed to indemnify Jacobsen
for all injuries resulting from its performance of the subcontract,
and such agreement is clearly broad enough to encompass the actions
of its subcontractors.
Boman again contends that it is somehow relevant that it was not
at the construction site often, and had little on-hands control of the
steel erection. This is irrelevant. Indemnity liability is triggered
by causation, not negligence.

Buscacrlia, 172 A.2d at 707.

Contrary to Boman's contentions, the Gordon decision is not
controlling on this issue.

In Gordon the indemnity agreement, as

summarized by the Court of Appeals, contained "no language . . .
indicating an intention to cover independent contractor performing
services . . . "

820 P. 2d at 495. In contrast, in this matter, Boman

agreed to broadly and expansively indemnify Jacobsen for all damages
resulting from its performance of the subcontract.

Clearly, such

language requires Boman to indemnify Jacobsen in this matter under the
subcontract's indemnity provision.
Finally, Boman argues that it is not liable to indemnify Jacobsen
21

under the indemnity provision in the subcontract because such provision only requires indemnity where Boman's agents caused the loss.
Boman argues that CCC&T and Daniel Brown are not its agents under
traditional principles of respondent superior, and that it therefore
is not responsible in indemnity for their actions.

Boman's conten-

tions ignore well-established law that "agents" in the indemnity
context are not limited by the factors that are usually considered in
determining

whether

an

employer-employee

relationship

exists.

Jacobsen's Opening Brief cited the decision of Baldwin Contracting Co.
v. Winston. 263 Cal. App. 2d 565, 46 Cal. Rptr. 421 (Cal. Ct. App.
1965) for the principle that the term "agent" in an indemnity agreement can include the indemnitor's subcontractor. The court's holding
in Baldwin is based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and on other
courts' decisions, which imposed vicarious liability on employers of
independent contractors under certain circumstances. The key to such
liability is found in § 416 of the Restatement. That provision reads:
One who employs an independent contractor to do work which
the employer should recognize as likely to create during
its progress a peculiar risk of physical harm to others
unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to them by the failure of the
contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such
precautions, even though the employer has provided for such
precautions in the contract or otherwise.
The California Supreme Court invoked § 416 in Van Arsdale v.
Hollinger. 437 P.2d 508, 66 Cal. Rptr. 20 (Cal. 1968), and Woolen v.
Aerojet General Corp., 369 P.2d 708, 20 Cal. Rptr. 12 (Cal. 1962).

7

Other persuasive authority on this issue is Western Contracting
Corp. v. Southwest Steel Rolling Mills. Inc., 58 Cal. App. 3d 532, 129
7

In the Woolen case, the court held that the term "others" in
§ 416 includes the employees of an independent contractor. 369
P.2d at 711.
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Cal. Rptr. 782 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976), where the plaintiff was killed
in a dam construction project. The general contractor on the project
was Western. Western's subcontractor was Southwest, the plaintiff's
employer.

Plaintiff's widow sued Western for her husband's death.

Based upon a written indemnity agreement with plaintiff's employer,
Western cross-claimed against Southwest. Southwest moved for summary
judgment on the cross-claim for indemnity, which was granted.
appeal, the California Court of Appeals reversed.

On

In so ruling, the

Court held that general contractor Western could be vicariously liable
for the acts of its independent contractor:
Because Southwest Mills was not an employee of Western, the
doctrine of respondeat superior was inapplicable. However,
there are a number of exceptions to the general rule that
one who employs an independent contractor is not liable for
that contractor's negligence. Particularly significant to
the immediate case is the exception which recognizes that
the employer is liable when a contractor is employed to do
"work in which there is a high degree of risk in relation
to the particular surroundings, . . ." (Prosser on Torts
(4th Ed.) p. 473; See also Rest. 2d, Torts § 416.)
129 Cal. Rptr. at 786-87 (footnote omitted).
The application of the above authorities to this appeal is
apparent. The term "agent" in an indemnity agreement can include the
indemnitor's subcontractor and the subcontractor's employees when the
independent contractor is retained to engage in work that has a
"peculiar risk;" i.e., is dangerous.

In this matter, it is obvious

that erecting the structural steel skeleton of a multi-story office
building is dangerous in the extreme. Thus, in accordance with § 416
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and the other authorities cited
above, Boman is obligated to indemnify Jacobsen under the indemnity
provision in the subcontract because CCC&T and Brown are its "agents"
within the meaning of the indemnity agreement.
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C.

It is irrelevant that CCC&T's negligence
would have to be considered by the jury in
establishing Boman/s indemnity liability to
Jacobsen.

Boman's final argument is that if Boman is liable to Jacobsen
under its indemnity contract, its liability will result solely because
of the acts of the plaintiff's employer, and that it would be improper
for the jury to consider the negligence of plaintiff's employer in
light of the trial court's ruling that the jury will not consider the
conduct of CCC&T. This argument is without merit• First, it ignores
Jacobsen's argument in this appeal that the trial court erred in
ruling that such evidence could not be considered by the jury.
Second, this Court has held that written contracts can vary the
general rule that an employer is not liable to third parties because
of the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act.
Shell Oil Company v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co..

658 P.2d 1187

(Utah 1983) . If this Court is willing to vary the general rule to the
degree that an employer is liable in money damages to a third party
(as it did in the Shell decision) , it should certainly permit the jury
to consider the employer's conduct for purposes of deciding if a party
other than the employer is liable for damages under a written
indemnity agreement. Furthermore, even if the Court believes it would
be confusing for the jury to consider the plaintiff's injury claims
and Jacobsen's indemnity claims on the same special verdict form or
in the same proceeding, arrangements can certainly be made at the
trial court level to separate those two claims, either by having the
jury indicate their findings on different special verdict forms, or
through bifurcating the personal injury and indemnity actions.
In sum, the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers Compensa24

tion Act was to protect employers from being liable in money damages
to third parties.
exclusive

remedy

A third party such as Boman cannot invoke the
provision

to protect

it from

its contractual

indemnity obligations. Boman must indemnify Jacobsen pursuant to the
indemnity agreement in the subcontract.
CONCLUSION
In order to arrive at a just verdict, the jury should be
permitted to understand all the factors that were involved in Daniel
Brown's accident, and apportion the causation attributable to all such
factors before apportioning "fault."

The trial court committed

reversible error in not permitting such allocation on the special
verdict form.
The trial court also erred by granting Boman's Motion for Summary
Judgment on Jacobsen's Cross-claim for contractual indemnity.

Boman

is obligated, under the indemnity provisions in both the prime
contract and the subcontract, to indemnify Jacobsen.
For the above reasons, Jacobsen respectfully requests the Court
to reverse the district court's orders.
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